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Determinants of equity pension plan flows*
Determinantes de los flujos monetarios en los planes de pensiones
Carmen Pilar Martí Ballester**
Abstract
The aim of this study is to analyze investor response to different measures of 
pension plan performance. To do this, we implement a fixed effects panel data 
methodology corrected by heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional 
dependence, as proposed by Vogelsang (2012). The results obtained show that 
investors make their decision to invest in a specific pension plan depending on 
past returns and the type of management company administering the plan. On 
analyzing the flow-performance relationship for each type of management company 
we find that both types of companies can differ in the information provided to 
investors and in their marketing strategies and services for attracting clients.
Key words: Return, Jensen’s Alpha, investor behavior, pension plan flows, 
panel data models
JEL Classification: C23, G23.
Resumen
El objetivo del presente trabajo es analizar el comportamiento del inversor 
ante diferentes medidas de performance de los planes de pensiones. Para ello, 
implementamos la metodología de datos de panel de efectos fijos, corrigiendo 
la heterocedasticidad, correlaciones serial, dependencia cross-sectional, 
propuesta por Vogelsang (2012). Los resultados indican que los inversores 
toman la decisión de invertir en un plan de pensiones concreto en función de 
la rentabilidad pasada y esta ajustada por el riesgo obtenidas por el gestor, así 
como en función del tipo de entidad gestora que administra el plan. Al analizar 
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la relación entre flujos monetarios y performance en función del tipo de entidad 
gestora encontramos que ambos tipos de entidades podrían suministrar diferente 
información a los clientes e implantar diferentes estrategias de marketing y 
proporcionar diferentes servicios adicionales relacionados con la inversión en 
planes de pensiones para atraer clientes.
Palabras clave: Rentabilidad, alfa de Jensen, comportamiento del inversor, flujos 
monetarios de los planes de pensiones, datos de panel.
Clasificación JEL: C23, G23.
1. Introduction
Pension fund assets in OECD countries reached 15.6 trillion euros in 2011, 
a figure close to that of mutual funds (17.1 trillion euros) accumulated in OECD 
countries in 2011, as stated by the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the Investment Company Institute, respectively. 
Thus, the pension plans and mutual fund industries have undergone considerable 
development, which has aroused major interest among the financial community 
in determining the factors that induce investors to select a specific mutual fund.
In this respect, most authors (for instance, Ippolito (1992), Sirri and Tufano 
(1998), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Fant and O’Neal (2000), and Goriaev 
et al. (2008)) coincide in stating that U.S. investors channel their savings into 
funds with better past performance, possibly in the hope of this performance 
being maintained in the future, considering the empirical evidence of persistence 
provided by Brown and Goetzmann (1995) and Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994).
However, monetary input is not proportional to the outflow occurring in the 
funds with the poorest performance, indicating an asymmetrical relationship 
that Lynch and Musto (2003) explain through the theory relating to the expected 
about-turn of investment policy, which Goetzmann and Peles (1997) justify 
through the theory of investor cognitive dissonance, and Huang et al. (2007), 
Barber et al. (2005) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) attribute to load costs 
incurred by the investor in making transfers between mutual funds, acting as 
an exit barrier for the fund.
This relationship is maintained using different measures of performance 
(raw return and Jensen’s Alpha) as shown by Sirri and Tufano (1998), Fant and 
O’Neal (2000) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), and its level of convexity is 
higher in smaller, younger mutual funds that demonstrate higher participation 
costs, according to Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goriaev et al. (2008) and Huang 
et al. (2007). In these cases, fund managers could have incentives to take higher 
levels of risk in order to gain significant flow if they manage the fund well and 
to avoid significant losses if they perform poorly, which may have implications 
for the risk and return that participants experience, as shown by Chevalier and 
Ellison (1997) and Lynch and Musto (2003).
However, US findings concerning the behavior of US investors cannot be 
applied universally, as shown by Ferreira et al. (2012). For example, Ferruz 
et al. (2009) show that investors in Spanish mutual funds do purchase poorly 
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performing funds, but in smaller proportions than they purchase good performing 
funds, while Alves and Mendes (2011) and Fiotakis and Philippas (2004) find that 
investors do not react to the past performance of Portuguese and Greek mutual 
funds, respectively, despite the persistently poor performance of Greek funds, 
which could be due to the existence of (1) an agency problem between large 
financial intermediaries and participants and/or (2) unsophisticated investors, 
as suggested by Ferreira et al. (2012).
While the mutual fund industry has received major attention from academics, 
the pension fund industry has been left in the background. Thus, Andonov et al. 
(2013) examine the probability of Canadian, European, U.S. and Australian/New 
Zealand pension funds investing in real estate, using a binary response logit 
model. Their findings show that smaller pension funds are less likely to invest in 
real estate internally, and have higher costs and lower returns than larger funds.
While Andonov et al. (2013) focus on different types of pension plans (public, 
corporate and others), Franzen (2010) focuses on examining the investment risk 
management of defined benefit occupational and state pension plans in Germany, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, concluding that 
changes in accounting rules based on the implementation of fair value criteria 
erode the risk-taking capacity of the plan sponsor. Brown et al. (2012) analyze 
the investment behavior of US defined benefit state pension plans that actively 
manage their equity portfolios implementing ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression. Their results show that states are able to generate excess returns 
through their in-state investment activities.
While the above-mentioned literature focuses on examining the investment 
behavior of pension plans, other authors: Krasnokutskaya and Todd (2009) and 
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), analyze the behavior of pension plan investors. 
With regard to these, Krasnokutskaya and Todd (2009) analyze the determinants 
of investors’ choices of Chilean pension fund and of pension fund characteristics, 
adopting a demand and supply model of the pension fund market for the period 
2002-2004. Their findings indicate that the existing regulations increase the level 
of risk in the market and reduce investors’ incentives to invest in pension funds.
Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find empirical evidence of a linear relationship 
between the flows and performance of US pension funds, in which Jensen’s alpha 
was particularly significant as a measure of performance. However, as occurs with 
the mutual fund industry, investors in US pension funds might behave differently 
to investors from less developed financial markets. This study therefore seeks 
to provide empirical evidence of investor behavior using different measures of 
performance in the Spanish market, an area that has not been extensively studied.
This study therefore diverges from that by Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) 
and Krasnokutskaya and Todd (2009) in terms of different aspects relating 
to the market studied, the data and the methodology used. Previous works on 
pensions have focused on the US and Chilean markets, respectively. Thus, while 
the Chilean pension system obliges all workers to contribute a pre-specified 
part of their wages to their pension account, with the government serving as a 
last-resort guarantor who supplements pension income in case of unfavorable 
returns on investment or low income, as commented by Krasnokutskaya and Todd 
(2009), the US and Spanish governments have adopted a pay-as-you-go social 
security system. Specifically, the Spanish pay-as-you-go social security system 
guarantees a minimum retirement pension that can be voluntarily complemented 
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with a private pension plan promoted by the firm where the employee works 
(occupational pension plans), financial entities (individual pension plans) or 
syndicates/labor unions/associations (associate pension plans).With regard to 
private pension systems, the Spanish government (1) promotes transparency 
of fees charged by management companies for their services, establishing a 
maximum limit of 2% and 0.5% of the assets under management for management 
and custodial fees, respectively, and (2) establishes minimum and maximum 
limits of investments depending on assets’ characteristics. However, Spanish 
regulations do not require managers to reach a minimum return and the Spanish 
government does not compensate losses obtained by private pension plans.
The extended social coverage provided by the social security system and the 
lack of government guarantees in case of unfavorable returns on private pension 
plan investment could be the reason why Spanish occupational pension plans 
accumulate a moderate volume of assets compared to occupational pension 
plans in other European countries and Spanish individual pension plans. 
Given that Spanish individual pension plans receive more contributions than 
occupational pension plans and have more participants, our proposal here is to 
focus on individual pension plans1, unlike Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and 
Krasnokutskaya and Todd (2009), who use occupational pension fund data.
This could have major implications on the results, because the two types of 
pension plan operate differently and require different management strategies, 
with individual pension plans being similar to mutual funds. Del Guercio 
and Tkac (2002) used a pooled methodology and Krasnokutskaya and Todd 
(2009) adopt a standard panel data method, while this study uses the panel data 
method proposed by Vogelsang (2012), which takes into account unobservable 
characteristics of pension plans and is robust in the presence of serial correlation, 
cross-sectional dependency and heteroskedasticity of distribution of the residuals 
present in our case.
This study’s findings could be of major interest to supervisory and regulatory 
bodies, as well as management and custodial companies. Knowledge of investor 
reaction to different measures of performance can provide information about 
the level of investor sophistication, thus encouraging (1) supervisory bodies to 
provide tools to improve the level of financial education by, for example, creating 
a website where they offer basic information on pension plans to unqualified 
investors and (2) regulators to propose legal changes to increase the transparency 
of the information provided by management companies to participants.
From the management companies’ perspective, knowledge of investors’ 
reactions to measures of performance will tell them about the existing incentives 
to modify negotiation strategies in order to increase participants’ contributions 
and transfers, which could lead to an increase in the remuneration received. For 
custodial companies, it may be important to know which factors influence the 
decision to invest in a specific pension plan in order to design and implement 
commercial policy.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we describe the data sources 
and define the variables to be analyzed. We then outline the methodology 
1 Spanish regulations establish that personal pension plans must be Defined Contribution 
Schemes (the promoters’ and/or participants’ contributions are defined).
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employed and the results obtained. Finally, we report our main conclusions 
and provide references.
2. Data and Variables
To analyze the behavior of investors in pension plans, we took monthly 
liquidation values, assets and participants for the period between January 31, 
2006 and May 30, 2011, corresponding to 101 equity personal pension plans 
provided by the Spanish Association of Collective Investment Institutions and 
Pension Plans (INVERCO). The Directorate-General of Insurance and Pension 
Funds (DGSFP) provided quarterly information on the names of management 
and custodial companies, custodial and management fees and the dates that 
plans were established. Additionally, we used the monthly returns of the Ibex-35 
index and the Morgan Stanley Capital International type indexes for the Spanish 
market obtained from the Madrid Stock Exchange and Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI), respectively. Morningstar provided the geographical 
market category in which pension plans mainly invest.
We omitted plans created after January 31, 2006, those with missing data for 
any of the months considered, and those dissolved during the period. Therefore, our 
data might be vulnerable to survivorship bias (Brown et al.1997) and look-ahead 
bias (Carhart, 1997), as Elton et al. (1996) and Malkiel (1995) have confirmed 
in equity mutual fund performance studies. However, these biases do not affect 
inference on the relationship between flow and performance, as pointed out by 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Sirri and Tufano 
(1998). In the Spanish pension fund market, Andreu et al. (2009) repeat their 
analysis on samples free of survivorship and look-ahead biases, reporting no 
significant changes in their inferences on equity pension plans. Given that we 
use the same database as Andreu et al. (2009), we think that our sample does 
not suffer from the above-mentioned biases.
We now present the dependent variable and the explanatory variables that 
were considered potential determinants of the behavior of investors in pension 
plans. These are briefly defined in Table 1.
Following Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Sirri and Tufano (1998), Patel et al. 
(1994) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997), we use asset flows as a dependent 
variable, defined as the net growth in pension plan assets beyond reinvested 
dividends. Flows for plan i in month t are thus calculated as:
(1) ( )= − +−
−
Flow
TNA TNA R
TNA
1
.i t
i t i t i t
i t
,
, , 1 ,
, 1
Where TNAi,tis plan i’s total net asset at time t, TNAi,t-1 is plan i’s total net 
asset at time t-1 and Ri,t is the plan’s return over the prior month.
We considered it important to include the return factor in the analysis, since it 
is the most important service provided to participants in pension plans. Effective 
active management might thus be expected to foster a positive relationship 
between flows and Jensen’s alpha obtained by a plan. To measure this relationship, 
following previous studies, such as Sirriand Tufano (1998), Fantand O’Neal 
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(2000), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) and Jain and Wu (2000), we used the return 
and Jensen’s alpha as measures of performance. So, we calculated the plans’ 
annual return (RETURN) in accordance with the standard procedure described 
in the literature. In order to run the risk-adjusted annual return (ALPHA), as in 
Elton et al. (1996), model (2) incorporates various benchmarks that represent 
the types of asset in which the sample plans could invest.
(2) 
α β β β β
β β β µ
= + + + + +
+ + +
r r r r r
r r r .
pt p ibex ibext world worldt eur eurt em emt
tb tbt bond bondt deb debt pt
TABLE 1
GLOSSARY OF VARIABLES
Variable Description
HRETURN Annual return of each pension plan, as a proportion of assets, 
belongs to top quintile return, 0 otherwise.
MRETURN Annual return of each pension plan, as a proportion of assets, 
belongs to middle quintile return, 0 otherwise.
LRETURN Annual return of each pension plan, as a proportion of assets, 
belongs to low quintile return, 0 otherwise.
HALPHA Annual risk-adjusted return of each pension plan belongs to 
top quintile alpha, 0 otherwise.
MALPHA Annual risk-adjusted return of each pension plan belongs to 
middle quintiles alpha, 0 otherwise.
LALPHA Annual risk-adjusted return of each pension plan belongs to 
low quintile alpha, 0 otherwise.
RISK The standard deviation of the past twelve month plan i returns 
at moment t.
FLOWSPAIN Growth of the plans’ asset invested in Spanish stocks in month t.
FLOWEUROPE Growth of the plans’ asset invested in European stocks in month t.
FLOWINTER Growth of the plans’ asset invested in International stocks 
in month t.
LSIZE Natural log of assets of each pension plan.
LAGE Natural log of number of years since pension plan was setup. 
LINVEST Natural log of assets of each plan minus natural log of number 
of participants in plan.
MGFEE Annual management fee as a proportion of pension plan assets.
CUSTFEE Annual custodial fee as a proportion of pension plan assets.
INSURANCE Dummy variable = 1 if management company is also an 
insurance company, 0 otherwise.
MANAGEMENT Dummy variable = 1 if management company only manages 
pension funds, 0 otherwise.
DECEMBER Dummy variable = 1 if the asset flows take place in December, 
0 otherwise.
FLOW Growth of the fund due to monetary inflows from outside.
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where rpt represents the excess return of plan p at moment t over the one-day 
Repos index, which is taken as the risk-free asset. αp 
represents the skill of a 
fund manager, which is measured as the expected return that a pension plan 
manager earns in relation to a multi-index performance benchmark based on 
the CAPM model. A positive alpha indicates that the pension plan manager 
is able to add value to the pension plan, while a negative alpha shows that the 
manager’s decisions subtract value from the pension plan.
We adopt as benchmarks the following indexes.The Ibex-35 index represents 
the benchmark for the Spanish stock market (IBEX). We also take into account 
the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indexes for the Spanish market: 
the world ex Europe index (world), the Europe index (eur), and the emerging 
markets index (em). Given that the Spanish Association of Collective Investment 
and Pension Funds (INVERCO) allows equity personal pension plans to invest 
up to a maximum of 25% of their portfolios in fixed-income equities, we include 
in our model the Financial International Analysts (AFI) type indexes for the 
Spanish fixed-income market: the AFI treasury bills Index (tb), the AFI Bond 
Index (bond) and the AFI debenture Index (deb)2.
This allows us to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional single-index 
model proposed by Jensen (1968), derived from the omission of benchmarks 
(the traditional Jensen’s alpha only uses one benchmark), which could produce 
biases in the performance evaluation, as commented by Elton et al. (1993) and 
Gruber (1996), when the manager invests in different types of asset and different 
geographical markets. Thus, our multi-index model uses a set of benchmarks, 
which represent different types of assets and different geographical stock markets 
in which a plan might invest, for evaluating financial performance.
Taking these data, return and Jensen’s alpha, we considered various measures 
of the fractional performance rank (RANK) of pension plan i in the previous 
month in order to examine the asymmetry of the performance-flow relationship. 
The performance ranks are divided into three unequal groups. We rank pension 
plans by month to form quintiles according to the measures of performance, either 
one-month lagged annual return or lagged Jensen’s alpha. Thus, HRETURN 
and HALPHA are the highest quintiles of performance, measured as return 
and Jensen’s alpha respectively, defined as Min(RANKi,t-1-Q5RANKi,t-1- 
Q4RANKi,t-1- Q3RANKi,t-1- Q2RANKi,t-1, 0.2), MRETURN and MALPHA 
combine the middle three performance quintiles, measured as return and Jensen’s 
alpha respectively, which are defined as Min(RANKi,t-1-Q5RANKi,t-1, 0.6) and 
LRETURN and LALPHA are the bottom performance quintiles, measured as 
return and Jensen’s alpha, which are defined as Min(RANKi,t-1, 0.2).
2 We examine the multicollinearity between the benchmarks to ensure that our proposed 
model does not generate results that reflect the actual investment style of the pension 
plan inappropriately. We find significant multicollinearity problems between the Ibex35 
index and the Europe index. To overcome the problem of multicollinearity, the Europe 
index variable is regressed against the ibex35 index variable (Europe index=dependent 
variable and Ibex35 index= independent variable), the residual of this regression being 
substituted for the original Europe index variable in the model [2] as in Park and Kerr 
(1990). Then, we analyze the correlation between the independent variables, not finding 
significant multicollinearity problems. These findings are available upon request to the 
author.
Estudios de Economía, Vol. 41 - Nº 1132
Given that Sirri and Tufano (1998), Huang et al. (2007) and Shu et al. 
(2002) find a marginal influence of risk on pension plan flows, we follow their 
approach and include the total risk of each plan measured by the annualized 
standard deviation of monthly plan returns over the past twelve months (RISK).
The investors could have preferences for pension plans that invest in domestic 
stocks, with domestic pension plans receiving more money entries than pension 
plans whose assetsare invested in international stocks, as shown by Brown 
et al. (2012). For this reason, we introduce the FLOWSPAIN variable in our 
model, which represents the growth of plans whose assets are mainly invested 
in domestic stocks in month t. The FLOWEUROPE variable represents the 
growth of plans whose assets are mainly invested in European stocks in month 
t and the FLOWINTER variable represents the growth of plans whose assets 
are mainly invested in international stocks in month t.
As in international empirical studies, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) found 
important differences in the flow-performance relationship incurred by mutual 
funds depending on their asset size, we measured this factor in terms of the 
natural log of the one-month lagged asset of each pension plan, LSIZE. Thus, 
according to Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), the coefficient associated with this 
variable will reveal the importance of agency relationships and/or client servicing, 
while Jain and Wu (2000), Sapp and Tiwari (2004) and Alves and Mendes (2011) 
suggest that the size of a fund could be a reflection of its reputation and visibility.
A further factor that may affect the behavior of investors in pension plans 
is the age of the plan, as shown by Goriaev et al. (2008), Chevalier and Ellison 
(1997), Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) and Benson 
et al. (2010). Plans that have remained on the market for longer periods may 
have greater potential to attract inflows of money than newer plans. Therefore 
the age of the plan, measured as the logarithm of the number of years since it 
started, with operations computed at the end of each month, is included in the 
proposed model (LAGE).
Several international authors, such as Shu et al. (2002), demonstrate that 
investors behave differently depending on whether they invest small or large 
amounts. We therefore include the average investment per participant (LINVEST), 
measured as the natural log of the assets of each plan minus the natural log of 
the number of participants in the plan.
Given that Barber et al. (2005) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) present evidence 
of a negative relation between fees and monetary flow, and Goriaev et al. (2008) 
and Alves and Mendes (2011) show a positive effect of fees on mutual fund 
flows, we include in the proposed model the variables MANFEE and CUSTFEE, 
defined as a proportion of pension plan assets under management and custody, 
respectively, corresponding to each pension plan.
The legal status of the management company can also influence investor 
behavior. Management companies authorized to operate in the area of life insurance 
could provide additional services related to investment in pension plans. For 
this reason, we include in the model the dummy variable INSURANCE, which 
takes the value 1 if the company administering the plan is authorized to operate 
in the insurance area and 0 if not.
Meanwhile, Greene and Hodges (2002) advise caution with December 
data due to the high frequency of distributions in this month for the mutual 
fund industry. For this reason, we include a dummy variable DECEMBER that 
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takes the value 1 if an observation is from December and otherwise is 0, to test 
whether the participants invest more frequently during this month in order to 
exploit tax benefits or promotional gifts.
3. Methodology and Results
The final sample includes data corresponding to 101 equity personal pension 
plans for the period between January 31, 2006 and May 30, 2011. In Table 1, we 
briefly define the variables built, taking these data into account, while in Table 2 
we show their descriptive statistics.To verify that there are no multicollinearity 
problems between the variables proposed, a matrix indicating correlation 
coefficients between independent variables has been created. The results, 
which are summarized in Table 3, indicate that there are no multicollinearity 
TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE SAMPLE OF PENSION PLANS
The sample period runs from March 31 2007 to May 31 2011. Each asset is measured 
in millions of euros, the average investment per participant in thousands of euros, age 
in years and fees as percentages of assets.
TABLE 2a
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Max Min
ALFA –0.0008 0.0140 0.3775 –0.0601
RETURN 0.0146 0.2133 0.8313 –0.5289
RISKt-1 0.1623 0.0729 2.5309 0.0261
FLOWSPAIN 0.0028 0.0427 0.5461 –0.4234
FLOWEUROPE 0.0339 0.6473 3.5663 –2.4834
FLOWINTER 0.0351 0.3358 1.6130 –1.8448
SIZEt-1 27.2000 45.2000 307.00 0.0050
AGE 8.7696 3.0354 22.6900 1.4300
INVESTt-1 7.0489 26.6936 1.8900 0.2546
MANFEE 0.0171 0.0045 0.0200 0.0000
CUSTFEE 0.0022 0.0017 0.0060 0.0000
R2 0.8705 0.1238 0.9959 0.2031
TABLE 2b
Variable Number Percentage (%)
INSURANCE 2630 51.06
MANAGEMENT 2521 48.94
Observations 5150
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problems, which agrees with Sharma and James (1981). Furthermore, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) for each regressor, presented in Table 3, is calculated and 
examined. The results are lower than ten, thereby confirming the absence of 
multicollinearity problems.
In order to analyze the behavior of participants in pension plans, we propose 
the following model, where the dependent variable is the monthly asset flow 
of each plan:
(3)    
α β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ + + + +
− − − −
− − −
− −
Flow LReturn MReturn HReturn LAlpha
MAlpha HAlpha Lsize Lage Insurance
FlowSpain FlowEurope FlowInter December
Risk Manfee Custfee Linvest ,
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
, 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 9 ,
10 , 11 , 12 , 13 ,
14 , 1 15 , 16 , 17 , 1 ,
where εi,t is the error term.
We used different approaches to estimate the above model, in order to ensure 
the robustness of the empirical results, including pooled OLS regression, and 
the fixed and random effects models. Wefirst ran the pooled OLS regression, 
the results of which are presented in Table 4. However, this technique may give 
biased and inconsistent estimates when there are unobserved characteristics.
Taking into account the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, we propose 
the use of the random effects and the fixed effects models to deal with the afore 
mentioned problem, summarizing the results in Table 4, and then we apply the 
adjusted Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects, as proposed by Bera 
et al. (2001), to test whether the variance of the random error is 0. This test 
(chi-squared (1):375.13; P-value: 0.000) shows that the null hypothesis of no 
random individual effects cannot be accepted. This evidence supports the results 
of the random effects estimation.
In order to test for the presence of plan-specific fixed effects, we performed 
the Wooldridge modified version of the Hausman test, which is robust to the 
heteroskedasticity of disturbance terms. The modified Hausman test statistics 
are highly significant (chi-squared (15): 68.59; p-value: 0.000), which rejects 
the null hypothesis of random effects in favor of the fixed effects specification.
This fixed effects model assumes that the errors are homoskedastic and 
spatially and temporally independent, obtaining biases estimators when there is 
dependence and heteroskedasticity problems in the term errors as shown by Beck 
(2001) and O’Connell (1998). Thus, like Horgos (2011) and Martí et al. (2013), 
we implement the modified Wald test for group wise for testing the hypotheses 
of homoskedasticity. The results obtained (chi-squared (101):45,498.77, p-value: 
0.000) fail to accept the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
We also adopt the Wooldridge test (2002) to verify the existence of first-
order autocorrelation in the residual, so the presence of serial correlation might 
underestimate the estimators (Fama and French, 2002 and Petersen, 2009). Our 
findings (F(1,100): 53.06; p-value: 0.000) fail to reject the null hypotheses of 
no serial correlation.
For testing the existence of cross-sectional independence we adopt Pesaran’s 
CD test (2004), which is asymptotically consistent (Hsiao et al., 2007). The 
result obtained (CD = 4.558; p-value 0.000) fails to accept the null hypotheses 
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of cross-sectional independence. In addition, we apply the Pesaran panel unit 
root test (2007), which is robust to cross-sectional dependence. The CIPS test 
results, summarized in Table 5, show that for all variables analyzed the unit root 
hypothesis is rejected when we take into account the trend and use the constant. 
Then, we proceed by taking all variables as I(0) variables.
Given that Vogelsang (2012) shows that in the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
serial correlation, spatial correlation and stationarity in the time dimension 
it is better to use the standard errors on the basis of the heteroskedasticity 
autocorrelation covariance matrix estimators (HAC) of cross-section averages 
proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998) than the cluster standard errors analyzed 
by Arellano (1987) and Petersen (2009), we estimate the model by taking into 
account the Vogelsang modified version of the Driscoll and Kraay standard 
errors. This approach provides consistent estimators when the individual fixed 
effects are correlated with the regressors, unlike Fama-MacBeth’sapproach 
(1973) and Robinson’s semiparametric method (1988). However, Vogelsang’s 
method assumes a linear relationship between dependent and independent 
variables obtaining biased estimators when this assumption is violated. Thus, 
we implement a modified Wald test proposed by Vogelsang (2012) that allows 
us to test the linear hypothesis (H0 : Rβ = r). Our finding (Chi-squared:1.20; 
fixed-b p-value: 0.30) fails to reject the mentioned null hypothesis.
Table 4 summarizes the results obtained using different regression techniques: 
pooled time-series cross-sectional regression analysis, random effect model, fixed 
effect regression model, Fama-MacBeth’sapproach, Petersen’s methodology and 
Vogelsang’s methodology. The estimations performed on these regression models 
present differences in level of significance and size. Therefore,the presence of 
unobservable characteristics and the existence of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation 
and cross-sectional dependence in the errors in the panel data models might lead 
us to overestimate or underestimate the effect of performance, investment risk, 
age of the plan, size of the plan, investment by participants, fees paid and type of 
the management company on the behavior of investors in pension plans.
TABLE 5
PESARAN’S CIPS PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS
Variables With an intercept With an intercept and  a linear trend
FLOW –4.043 *** –4.300 ***
LRISK –1.303 –2.711 ***
LINVEST –1.583 –2.759 ***
LSIZE –1.188 –2.541 **
LAGE –3.279 *** –4.952 ***
ALFA –2.754 *** –2.828 ***
RETURN –2.424 **** –2.889 ***
The reported values are CIPS statistics, which are cross section averages of cross-sectionally aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller test statistics (Pesaran (2007)). Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% is denoted 
as ***, **, and *, respectively.
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Taking into account the results obtained applying the approach proposed by 
Vogelsang (2012), the evidence found suggests that investors in pension plans 
use returnsand risk-adjusted returns to evaluate managers. So, we find that the 
relation between pension plan flow and return (risk-adjusted return) is positive and 
highly statistically significant among high performers. Specifically, an additional 
1% of return (risk-adjusted return) approximately implies an additional 0.03% 
(0.013%) growth rate for the top pension plans, ranked according to one-lagged 
annual return (risk-adjusted return). However, we find a positive (negative) and 
non significant relationship between return (risk-adjusted return) and flows of 
pension plans for other quintile returns (risk-adjusted return).
Thus, as in previous studies, such as Sirri and Tufano (1998), Huang et al. 
(2007), Barber et al. (2005) and Ferruz et al. (2009), the results show that 
participants do not punish poorly performing managers by with drawing assets 
from under their management and flocking instead to recent good performers. 
This absence of a strong link between performance and flows for the poorest 
performers could be attributable to (1) the presence of cautious clients in the 
pension plan industry who may invest in consideration of other factors such 
as fiscal benefits and promotional gifts, among others, (2) the existence of 
a disposition effect whereby investors do not sell funds that perform poorly, 
staying invested in the hope that the fund price returns to the original purchase 
price (Shefrin and Statman (1985)) or in the belief that mutual fund perceived 
past performance is above actual past performance, from which investors 
tend to adjust their beliefs to justify their past purchase in order to resolve the 
discrepancy between performance and past purchase (Goetzmann and Peles, 
1997 and Chen and Lai, 2010) and/or (3) the existence of familiarity bias as 
found by Brown et al. (2012), from which investors tend to invest in pension 
plans that invest in sectors or stocks from Spain, without taking into account 
their risk-return binomial.
This finding contrasts with Del Guercio and Tkac (2002), who find a 
linear relationship between occupational pension plan flows and performance 
that they attribute to the favorable tax treatment of pension plans. However, 
Spanish investors in pension plans also transfer consolidated rights from one 
individual plan to another without paying any taxes, so the different results 
for the shape of the relationship between flows and performance obtained are 
due to other causes.
In this vein, the differences in the behavior of participants in occupational 
and individual pension plans may be due to the different ways in which the two 
institutions operate, as in the former the transfer of consolidated rights occurs 
when (1) employment terminates and this is established in the specifications of 
the pension plan and (2) the pension scheme’s supervisory committee makes 
that decision.
When this occurs, the pension scheme’s supervisory commission must inform 
and respond to participants. This can create incentives within the supervisory 
committee to transfer the most poorly performing assets of pension funds to 
those that have obtained the best performance, because otherwise they could be 
accused of poor judgment. In contrast, participants in individual pension plans 
and investors in mutual funds do not have to defend their choices to anyone 
and may not wish to withdraw all of their assets from one fund or plan and put 
them in another.
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The existence of familiarity bias is congruent with the positive and significant 
relationship found between the FLOWSPAIN, FLOWEUROPE and FLOWINTER 
variables and the dependent variable FLOW. The results indicate that participants 
make more contributions or transfers to pension plans that invest their assets in 
Spanish stocks than to pension plans that invest their assets in European stocks 
or in stocks from other foreign countries.
Table 4 also shows that pension plans managed by insurance companies 
obtain significantly higher inflows than those managed by companies that only 
administer pension funds (management companies). This finding could be due 
to the fact that insurance companies (1) provide additional services related to 
their investment in pension plans and/or (2) use different management strategies 
for capturing a specific type of investor assuming different risk in relation to 
management companies. Thus, managers could implement an active or passive 
management strategy to manage their portfolios. A passive management strategy 
consistsof investing most pension plans’ assets byreplicating the composition 
of one or several indexes or investingin index/es, while an active management 
strategy consistsof selecting individual stocks that outperform any passive index 
investing (Amihud and Goyenko, 2013).
3.1. Analyzing management strategies implemented by insurance and 
management companies
To analyze active management strategies implemented by mutual fund 
managers, Amihud and Goyenko (2013) propose using the 1-R2 measure, which 
they define as the weight of the variance of the tracking error with respect to 
a multiple-factor benchmark in the total return variance. This measure is more 
suitable than the Active Shares (AS) measure for analyzing the active management 
strategies when the fund’s manager invests in more than one asset class, so it 
allows us to detect funds which implement a passive multi-index investing, unlike 
the Active Shares (AS) measure proposed by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Given 
that Amihud and Goyenko (2013) find that R2 is related to fund characteristics, 
we examine the existence of differences between management strategies adopted 
by management companies and insurance companies, controlling for age of the 
plan, size of the plan, investment by participant, management fee and custodial 
fee. Thus, we propose the following model which is similar to that proposed by 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013):
(4) 
α β β β β
β β ε
− = + + + + + +
+ + +
R1 Insurance Lage Lsize Linvest
Manfee Custfee ,
i i i i i i
i i i t
2
1 2 3 4
5 6 ,
where εi,t is the error term.
We estimate this model using robust ordinary least square technique. Table 6 
shows the results obtained indicating that there are no significant differences, 
on average, between management strategies adopted by insurance companies 
and management companies. We also conduct a test of robustness based on 
a mean comparison test of two groups, whose results (Student –t = –0.4784; 
p-value = 0.63) are congruent with the previous result. Therefore, the highest 
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inflows received by insurance companies could be the result of differences in 
the service provided to investors with respect to management companies.
3.2. Analyzing the flow-performance relationship by type of 
management company
In previous sections, we control for the influence of the management 
company by including as a dummy variable the type of management company 
(insurance company vs management company), which significantly affects the 
relationship between performance and flow. Management companies belonging 
to these groups could differ in their after-sales service, advertising policies, or 
information policies, among other ways of attracting investors,which could 
cause their clients to react differently to return, risk-adjusted return andportfolio 
risk. To examine this, we propose the following model, which focuses on the 
subsample composed of plans managed by insurance companies and on the 
subsample composed by plans administered by management companies.
(5)   
α β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + +
+ + +
− − − −
− − −
−
−
Flow LReturn MReturn HReturn LAlpha
MAlpha HAlpha Lsize Lage FlowSpain
FlowEurope FlowInter December Risk Manfee
Custfee Linvest ,
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
, 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1
5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 8 , 9 ,
10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 1 14 ,
15 , 16 , 1 ,
where εi,t is the error term.
This model is estimated using the methodology proposed by Vogelsang, which 
allows us to correct heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and cross-sectional 
dependence problems. The results obtained are summarized in Table 7, showing 
that investors in pension plans managed by insurance companies use returns to 
evaluate managers while investors in pension plans managed by specialized or 
pure management companies employ risk-adjusted return to evaluate them. This 
TABLE 6
DETERMINANTS OF ACTIVE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Variables Coefficients
INSURANCE –0.0037
LSIZE i,t-1 –0.0225
LAGEi,t –0.0081
LINVEST i,t-1 0.0064
MANFEEi,t 0.3812
CUSTFEEi,t –6.4081 **
Constant 0.3350 ***
Number plans 101
R-squared 0.0482
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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could indicate that, although Spanish Law does not mandate managers to inform 
investors about pension plans’ risk-adjusted return, management companies 
(specializing only in managing pension plans) could be doing so, unlike insurance 
companies, which could be providing only mandatory information (percentages 
of custodial and management fees and return).
Thus, higher performers (according to return measure in the case of insurance 
companies and risk-adjusted return measure in the case of pure management 
companies) receive significantly more inflows than other pension plans for 
other performance quintiles. On the other hand, poor performers plans do not 
experience significant outflows in their portfolios, which could be due to (1) the 
presence of cautious clients in the pension plans industry, (2) the existence of a 
disposition effect and (3) the existence of familiarity bias from which investors 
prefer to invest in stocks from the domestic market. Congruently with the above-
mentioned familiarity bias, our results show that pension plans that invest in 
Spanish stocks receive significantly more inflows than pension plans that invest 
in European or International stocks, as in Brown et al. (2012).
Our findings also show that younger pension plans managed by specialized 
(pure) management companies are preferred by investors. This could be due 
to specialized management companies promoting advertising in young plans, 
TABLE 7
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PENSION PLAN FLOWS BY TYPE 
OF MANAGEMENT COMPANY
Variables
Insurance Companies Management Companies
Vogelsang’s coefficients Vogelsang’s coefficients
LALFA i,t–1 0.0017 0.0009
MALFA i,t–1 –0.0080 –0.0004
HALFA i,t–1 0.0105 0.0797 **
LRETURN i,t–1 0.0069 0.0192
MRETURN i,t–1 0.0059 0.0016
HRETURN i,t–1 0.0280 ** 0.0203
RISK i,t–1 –0.0353 0.0037
FLOWSPAINi 0.1129 *** 0.1595 ***
FLOWEUROPE 0.0141 *** 0.0201 ***
FLOWINTER 0.0263 *** 0.0247 ***
LSIZE i,t–1 –0.0225 0.0189
LAGEi,t –0.0081 –0.0160 *
LINVEST i,t–1 0.0064 –0.0258
MANFEEi,t 0.3812 0.1037
CUSTFEEi,t –6.4081 * –0.5875
DECEMBERi,t 0.0070 ** –0.0038
Constant 0.3350 * –0.0496
Observations 5150 5150
Number plans 101 101
R-squared 0.1569 0.1234
*, **, *** Significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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which have not acquired the reputation of the old plans, more actively than 
insurance companies. This result is consistent with Alves and Mendes (2011) 
and Goriaev et al. (2008).
The contributions of investors to pension plans managed by insurance 
companies increase significantly in December, which could be explained by 
(1) insurance companies promoting their pension plans (for example, by giving 
promotional gifts) more actively in December than specialized management 
companies, or (2) insurance companies providing a tax advice service to their 
clients, who could make contributions to their pension plans at the end of the 
year in order to exploit tax benefits.
Investors of pension plans managed by insurance companies are significantly 
more sensitive about the custodial fees paid to the custodial company than 
investors of pension plans managed by specialized management companies. 
Thus, pension plans managed by insurance companies which are charged higher 
custodial fees receive significantly fewer capital inflows than those charged 
lower custodial fees.
Strikingly, while investors of pension plans managed by specialized 
management companies use systematic risk (controlled by means of Jensen’s 
alpha) for making purchase decisions, investors of pension plans administered 
by insurance companies do not take into account systematic risk or risk for their 
purchase decisions, as indicated by the lack of significant relationship between 
pension plan flow and risk or risk-adjusted return in Table 7.
This finding may be due to investors of pension plans managed by insurance 
companies (1) treating all plans within an investment style as equally risky, as 
shown by Fant and O’Neal (2000) or (2) not knowing that they are taking a risk 
when they invest their wealth in a specific equity pension plan or (3) not having 
been informed about the risk and systematic risk of their pension plans or (4) 
suffer from familiarity bias as found by Brown et al. (2012), tending to invest 
in pension plans that invest in sectors or stocks from Spain, without taking their 
risk into accountor (5) tending to prioritize return without taking the risk into 
account, since the Spanish pay-as-you-go social security system will provide 
them with a minimum retirement pension when they retire, causing a moral 
hazard behavior.
This may encourage managers of insurance companies to take more risks 
with their portfolios as found by Krasnokutskaya and Todd (2009) in the Chilean 
market. However, the reason why Spanish and Chilean managers might take 
more risk is different. Thus, while Chilean AFP firms have incentives to invest in 
riskier portfolios created by Chilean law, which makes firms guarantee minimum 
returns, the incentives of Spanish insurance companies to take more risk could be 
due to (1) the lack of available information about risk assumed by the investors in 
their investment (on the managers’ side), (2) the low incidence of penalties when 
the manager obtains poor returns and the significant benefits when the manager 
gains the highest returns independently of the risk assumed, which is likely due 
to moral hazard behavior led by the extended social coverage the social security 
system provides (on the investors’ side) and (3) the lack of rules that mandate 
managers to inform investors about risk assumed in their investment (on the 
regulators’ side). This situation allows Spanish insurance companies to seek to 
achieve gains that might enable them to gain more money and thereby increase 
their remuneration, as in Chevalier and Ellison (1997), while the probable losses 
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incurred by increasing the portfolio risk are assumed by the investors who might 
suffer from familiarity bias and from moral hazard behavior due to high protection 
provided by the Spanish social security system, which encourages investors to 
look for high returns without taking into account risk assumed.
Thus, there could be differences between the risks assumed by insurance 
companies and specialized management companies in the management of 
their portfolios. However, when we run the two groups’ mean comparison test 
(t: –0.7058; p-value: 0.4819), we find that there are no differences between 
the risks assumed by these two types of companies in the management of their 
portfolios. We also compare the existence of differences in return obtained by 
the two types of companies (t: 1.5294; p-value: 0.1294) and the risk-adjusted 
return achieved by insurance companies and specialized management companies 
(t: –0.0450; p-value: 0.9642), not finding significant differences between results 
of both types of companies. This could be produced by Spanish law, which 
establishes limits in the composition of portfolios, which could obstruct the 
appropriate diversification of the portfolios, limiting their risk. This could be 
the reason why over 90% of the return variability of most pension plans can be 
replicated by major indexes as shown Table 2.
Therefore, we conclude that differences in capital inflows between pension 
plans managed by specialized management companies and pension plans 
administered by insurance companies could be due to differences in the marketing 
strategies used and/or differences in post-sales services, such as tax advice, or 
additional information provided.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study has analyzed the behavior of investors in pension plans using 
different measures of performance: return and Jensen’s alpha, controlling for 
the legal nature of management companies, age, volatility and size of pension 
plans, average investment, management fee and custodial fee, as well as for the 
growth rate of net new money for all plans in the equity investment category 
and contributions made at the end of the year.
To achieve this, a panel data model has been proposed implementing the 
methodology outlined by Vogelsang (2012) using a sample consisting of 101 
equity pension plans. Unlike other estimation methods (ordinary least square, 
traditional fixed effects, traditional random effects, Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) 
approach and Petersen’s method (2009)) the technique proposed by Vogelsang 
(2012) provides consistent and robust estimators when the distribution of the 
residuals presents problems with heteroskedasticity and dependence. The estimators 
obtained by implementing this technique differ in terms of size and significance 
from the other models mentioned above, highlighting the importance of adopting 
the most appropriate method in order to obtain more robust conclusions.
The results obtained show a positive, significant relationship between pension 
plan flows and return, risk-adjusted return, the type of management company 
and the flows experienced by pension plans that invest in Spanish, European 
and International stock markets, respectively.
Thus, we find that the relationship between pension plan flows and return 
(risk-adjusted return) is convex, as in previous studies of the mutual fund industry 
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(Sirri and Tufano (1998)). Participants therefore make transfers and significant 
contributions to plans that have achieved the highest returns (risk-adjusted 
returns) in the past, while the contributions and transfers to plans with poorer 
returns (risk-adjusted returns) are smaller and less significant. This finding could 
indicate that there are investors in Spainw ho do not sell poorly performing 
pension plans despite their consistently poor performance, as shown by Ferruz 
et al. (2007) and Martí (2009).
This could be attributable to (1) the presence of cautious clients in the pension 
plan industry who may invest in consideration of other factors such as fiscal 
benefits and promotional gifts, among others, (2) the existence of a disposition 
effect (Shefrin and Statman (1985), Goetzmann and Peles (1997) and Chen and 
Lai (2010)) and/or (3) the existence of familiarity bias (Brown et al. (2012)). 
Congruently with the presence of familiarity bias, we find that pension plans 
that invest in Spanish stocks receive significantly higher capital inflows than 
other pension plans that invest in European or International stocks.
The legal status of management companies also has a significant effect 
on the monetary input into pension plans. In this regard, companies that are 
authorized to operate in life insurance receive significantly greater monetary 
input than pension plans administered by pure management companies, which 
could be because the former provide investors with additional services related 
to investment in pension plans (for example, tax advice) and/or implement 
different marketing strategies that attract more clients, so an analysis based on 
a mean comparison test of the two groups shows that there are no differences 
between pure management companies and insurance companies with respect 
to return reached, risk assumed, risk-adjusted return obtained and management 
strategy implemented.
Thus, although managers of insurance companies could have an incentive to 
take more risk, given that (1) their investors do not react to poor risk-adjusted 
return and risk measures,likely because investors are guaranteed a minimum 
retirement pension from the social security system, which leads to a moral hazard 
behavior in which they try to complement this pension by making contributions 
to private pension plans, considering their high returns independently of the risk 
assumed, and (2) Spanish legislation3 does not mandate managers to inform 
investors about risk measure, pure management companies and insurance 
companies take a similar risk, in general. This could be due to restrictions in 
the investment policies of a portfolio imposed by Spanish legislation. These 
restrictions could prevent appropriate portfolio diversification, limiting the 
risk, which could be the reason why over 90%, on average, of return variability 
reached by most pension plans in our sample can be replicated by major indexes.
3 Nowadays, Spanish legislation makes it compulsory for management companies to inform 
participants every six months, or every three months if they so request, of the fees and 
pension plan’s return in the previous financial year. However, this rule does not refer to 
the risk borne by these financial instruments.
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